Democracy, state and development: the case of the post-leninist Ukraine by Kutuev, Pavlo
УДК 316.422+323](477) 
Pavlo Kutuev 
DEMOCRACY, STATE AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE 
OF THE POST-LENINIST UKRAINE 
The paper analyzes the interplay of political regime and state in post-Leninist Ukraine and 
elucidates the factors that have brought the country's development/modernization aspirations to 
standstill. The article makes vast use of Weber's concepts of political sociology with a special 
emphasis on the notion of patrimonial state and its consequences for the societal development. 
That king who tells his people that he is 
their protector but who does not or is unable 
to protect them, should be killed by his 
subjects in a body like a dog that is affected 
with the rabies and has become mad. 
Mahabharata 
[quotedin l,p.268] 
This paper seeks to analyze the interrelation 
and interpénétration between major societal 
spheres critical for successful handling of the 
post-Leninist modernization/developmental 
project - Ukrainian state formation and political 
regime developments. The state is understood 
in this article as "a set of organizations through 
which collectivities of officials may be able to 
formulate and implement distinctive strategies 
and policies" [2, p.20-21]. In my conceptuali-
zation of political regimes I draw upon Highly 
and Burton who define them as "basic pattern 
of organization, exercise, and transfer of 
government decision-making power" [3, p. 18]. 
It should also be taken into account that 
transformation of Ukrainian society - the 
country with a seventy-year rule of Leninist 
regime - differs dramatically from supposedly 
the same events in the polities involved into 
the socialist international system for forty years. 
This distinction was made by Ernst Gellner who 
has observed that "there is a perceptible 
difference between the areas that have been 
parts of the union since the Revolution, and 
those that were incorporated in it only at the 
end of the Second World War. The difference 
between seventy and forty years seems to 
affect the nature of social memory profoundly: 
the forty-year-ers have a sharp sense of what 
the other world is like, and the seventy-year-
ers have largely lost it. They know no other" 
[quoted in 4, p.31]. 
Machiavelli formulated the universal 
challenge facing any undertaker of sweeping 
socio-political change in the following terms : "It 
ought to be considered that there is nothing more 
difficult to plan, more unlikely to succeed with, 
or more dangerous to manage than to take the 
lead in introducing new methods of government, 
because the introducer has as enemies all those 
who profit from the old method, and as only 
lukewarm defenders all those who will profit 
from the new ones. This lukewarmness results 
partly from fear of their adversaries, who have 
the laws on their side, partly from the incredibility 
of men, who do not really trust a new program 
unless they learn by experience that it is firmly 
established" [5, p. 110]. "The central question in 
the Soviet Union today is political, not economic, 
technological or military", advanced 
Machiavelli's argument further a brilliant student 
of Leninist societies Ken Jowitt on a wake of 
the USSR disintegration [6]. The same statement 
is a relevant diagnosis of the current sociopolitical 
constellation in now post-Leninist Ukraine. In a 
light of this, it is puzzling how little attention 
scholars have paid to the issue of political regime 
with its embeddedness and elective affinity to 
new societal (dis)order. The lack of the general 
theory capable of formulating and dealing with 
pressupositional issues have produced vague 
particularistic accounts of post-Leninist regimes, 
thus, assisting the transformation of Sovietology 
- a discipline with a solid theoretical background 
-into atheoretical "transitology". Moreover, the 
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latter has become akin rather to investigative 
journalism than to academic endeavor. In this 
respect it is worth noting that the choice of the 
terms Leninist and post-Leninist regimes has 
been made deliberately. The notion of the 
"Leninist Phenomenon" is of critical importance 
for correct understanding and definition of the 
societies under the Leninist party rule and after 
its demise. Elaborate development of this point 
can be found in Ken Jowitt's brilliant account in 
his seminal "New World Disorder" [6]. I am also 
talking about transformation instead of transition. 
The latter concept even linguistically implies 
smooth, evolutionary and unproblematic -
basically technical - shift from one type of 
societal organization to another. Criticism of 
Western Sovietology and transitology stress on 
evolutionary aspects of the social change in 
Leninist and post-Leninist countries can be found 
in Jowitt's illuminating paper [7]. Both regimes 
have to "attack the institutional bases" [6] of 
peasant and (post)socialist society respectively. 
Contrary to their Leninist predecessors post-
Leninist polities are characterized by the total 
lack of clear vision of transformation strategy. 
This is particularly the case of Ukraine which is 
suffering from inadequate leadership incapable 
of handling the task of transforming social, 
economic, and political institutions as well as 
cultural system of the society. The distinction 
between policy choices and alternatives of 
historical development has been suggested by 
Zbigniew Brzezinski in his pioneering account 
of then the Soviet political system developmental 
dilemmas [8]. 
The fact that no social theory has so far 
produced a valid long term predictive insights 
does not undermine the centrality of the 
theoretically oriented discourse for the inquiry 
into the nature of post-Leninist societal systems 
and political communities. The total absence of 
clear theoretical perspective often produces 
false accounts which appear to be a chaotic mis 
mash of various incompatible concepts. By 
assuming "coherent, durable monads rather than 
contingent, transitory connections among socially 
constructed identities" [9, p. 1595] scholar fails 
to appreciate the fact "that regularities in political 
life are very broad, indeed trans-historical, but 
do not operate in the form of recurrent structures 
and processes at a large scale" [9, p. 1601]. For 
instance, one of the attempts at defining the 
political regime of contemporary Ukraine arrived 
at the conclusion that it can be characterized 
as a "mixed one", combining "elements of all 
(sic! -P.K.) major "pure" political regimes: a) 
democratic, b) authoritarian, c) autocratic, d) 
dictatorial, e) totalitarian, f) anarchic, and g) 
ochlocratic" [10, p. 119]. This paradigmatic 
example of an inadequate application of so-called 
"muliti-factor" interpretation of the phenomena 
of social and political life is something critically 
different from Max Weber's concern about how 
to distinguish culturally significant causes of 
social action identifying "whether they are 
"adequate" or "inadequate" in relation to one 
another" [ll,p.341]. 
Having sacrificed social and political theory 
as a discourse in favor of "explanatory" pseudo-
practically oriented paradigm, social scientists 
have deprived themselves of the analytical tools 
for explaining social facts. Perhaps, the best 
example of such confusion caused by the lack 
of discursive argument is Linz and Stepan's 
volume on democratic transit ion and 
consolidation of post-authoritarian and post-
Leninist regimes. Having identified volume's 
subject-matter and even conclusions in book's 
title, the authors, in fact, mostly deal with the 
threats of the breakdown of democracy and 
market failures in post-Soviet socio-cultural and 
political setting [12]. It is worth recalling here 
Weber who insisted that "it is, not of course, my 
aim to substitute for a one-sided materialistic 
an equally one-sided spiritualistic casual 
interpretation of culture and of history. Each is 
equally possible, but each, if it does not serve 
as the preparation, but as a conclusion of an 
investigation, accomplishes equally little in the 
interest of historical truth" [13, p. 183]. The same 
conclusion holds true concerning the 
interpretation of the phenomenon of Leninist 
extinction and subsequent developments - both 
transition to market democracy model and 
societal transformation/degeneration approach 
are valid provided that they are sensitive to the 
singularity of social and political processes as 
well as their cultural milieu. 
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More recent attempt of Kyiv-based author 
Volodymyr Polokhalo to draw a line between -
in fact to insulate - allegedly already adequate 
and rich empirical research and theoretical 
conceptualization [14] fails to utilize findings of 
post-positivist philosophy and methodology of 
social sciences which go beyond ontological 
opposition "fact-theory" stipulating its analytical 
nature. Contemporary theorists of sociology and 
politics assert that "the empirical data of science 
are theoretically informed. The fact-theory 
distinction is neither epistemological nor 
ontological... It is analytical distinction. Scientific 
commitments are not based solely on empirical 
evidence. Fundamental shifts in scientific beliefs 
occur only when empirical changes are matched 
by the availability of convincing theoretical 
alternatives [15]. Seeking "salvation from 
unfamiliar phenomena in familiar terms" [16, 
p.245], usually has a false account as its result. 
Polokhalo labels current Ukrainian socio-political 
arrangement as post-communist neototalita-
rianism which combines features of 
authoritarianism and oligarchy [14] while failing 
to explain why neo-totalitarian polity is being 
defined in terms ofauthoritarian regime. Thus, 
his false account fails to appreciate the continuity 
and change in the development of Leninist 
systems and dynamics of Leninist legacies. To 
deny the Leninist extinction and argue that the 
Soviet rulers masterminded the transition from 
Leninist party-state rule to post-Leninist neo-
totalitarian dictatorship as Polokhalo does is to 
ignore the singularity of developmental stages 
of Soviet regime - from totalitarianism (or 
transformation and consolodation stages in terms 
of Jowitt's typology) to post-totalitarian 
arangenemnt (inclusion stage achieved through 
social mechanism of neo-traditionalism) and 
gives to much credit to purposive activities of 
ruling establishment of Leninism on its late stage. 
Polokhalo tends to forget Weber observation that 
"the yardstick of moralist is not a yardstick of 
the politician" [17, p. 389] nor that of a scholar 
we may add and accuses Ukrainian post-
Leninist society in submission to and 
"pathological solidarity with former 
nomenklatura". Unfortunately, moralizing 
criticism rarely contributes to our understanding 
of societal dynamics. What has been labeled 
pathological solidarity and immoral 
"compromise" has been a result of removal of 
limits imposed by Leninist regime on a Soviet 
scavenger society which was very much akin 
to Marx's ideal type of 19th century atomic and 
egoistic civil society. 
Thus, thinking theoretically about post-
Leninist regimes in general and Ukrainian case 
in particular, helps address issues relevant to both 
academic commentators and policy 
practitioners. Theorizing about alleged 
democratic nature of emerged post-Leninist 
regimes is tensely intertwined with a discourse 
on state and development of the societies in 
question. 
Ukrainian state formation has so far born a 
great resemblance to the absolutist Europe's 
mode of state making as organized crime [18]. 
Absolutist state tax policies, discussed by Tilly, 
are strikingly akin to those employed by the 
government of independent Ukraine. Tax police 
seizures and customs levies and duties - policies 
enjoyed by absolutist states at their mercantilist 
stage is a favorite policy instrument of Ukraine's 
government. State Customs Committee of 
Ukraine "success" in filling the empty state 
treasury - its contribution amounted for 
approximately 20% of budget revenues for 1998 
- while helps resolve short term policy goals 
makes Ukraine a nightmare for prospective 
investors in a long run. Recently conducted DHL 
survey of European customs agencies efficiency 
ranked Ukraine fourth among worst, giving way 
only to Bosnia, Yugoslavia and Moldova [19, 
P.6B]. 
New institutions of Ukrainian state and 
political society attempt to recapitulate Western 
liberal democratic patterns of political 
organization and policy choices, but the 
resemblance of structures does not automatically 
lead to the similarity of values and patterns of 
behavior let alone institutions' legitimacy. This 
pattern of activities is far from Weberian 
procedural rationality of methodical acquisition 
of economic and political resources. Impersonal 
practices and norms of modern rational-legal 
state have been greatly influenced by the 
experience of ascetic Protestantism because 
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Protestant "sect opposes the charisma of office 
and insists upon "direct democratic 
administration" by the congregation and upon 
treating the clerical officials as servants of 
congregation" [ 11, p. 1207-1208]. These activities 
can be understood at best as a strive for regime 
justification since, as Offe and Preuss have 
insightfully noted, the ""democracy" has become 
a universal formula of legitimation of a broad 
range of radically different societies and their 
respective models of governance and 
participation. By the mid-1970s, there was 
virtually no regime between Chile and China that 
did not rest its claims to legitimacy upon being 
"democratic" in some sort, or at least upon its 
being in the process of some transition to some 
version of democracy. Thus the term 
"democracy" seemed to have lost its 
distinctiveness: it failed to highlight significant 
differences between socio-political 
arrangements" [20, p. 143]. Stripped of its social 
and economic content, democracy in Ukraine 
has been reduced to mere procedural 
electoralism - an efficient tool of manipulation 
in hands of those with a privileged access to 
"generalized means of exchange" - to employ 
Parsons' terminology - money and power. As 
Ken Jowitt spells it out "the institutional 
framework, the practice and habits of elites, and 
the sociocultural constitutions in these countries 
assign critically different meaning to events in 
Western democracies and Eastern European 
countries" [6, p.291]. 
President Kuchma has recently credited 
himself for creating a stable society in Ukraine 
[21]. This may well have been true - the social, 
political and economic arrangements of the post-
Leninist Ukraine are strikingly stable especially 
in a light of dismantling of the Soviet system of 
laisser faire and continued economic decline, 
which finds no parallel even in a Great 
Depression. As the Brazilian scholar Francisco 
Weffort has correctly noted "the process of 
political democratization occurred at the same 
moment in which those countries suffered the 
experience of a profound and prolonged 
economic crisis that resulted in mass social 
exclusion and massive poverty... Some of these 
countries are building a political democracy on 
a top of a minefield of social apartheid..." [quoted 
in 22, p. 17]. Most "advanced" transitologists, 
drawing upon African and Latin American 
experiences of "democratic consolidation" have 
formulated the challenge to developmental 
agenda as follows: "How can structural 
adjustment in economy, which imposes so much 
short-term pain.. ., be reconciled with 
democracy?" [23, p.41]. In Ukrainian case the 
question must be re-phrased: How can collapse 
of the economy which imposes long-term pain 
can be reconciled with a relative stability 
(understood for the sake of clarity and simplicity 
as a lack of violent conflicts and civil unrest) of 
regime? This question is particularly puzzling 
since population at large is showing no trust in 
state institutions while exhibiting increasing 
dissatisfaction with catastrophically deteriorating 
life standards. Students of post-Leninism often 
come up with one-sided physiological-
aggregated explanation stressing population's 
fear of "social chaos under the radicalization of 
societal changes" [24, с 10] which fails to 
conceptualize the rationale behind regime 
existence and stability. This problem resembles 
the puzzle of the Soviet regime stability so 
vigorously discussed by Sovietologists not so long 
ago. The most plausible answer has been 
suggested by Ken Jowitt: "The Soviet Union 
lasted as long as it did, because it disciplined 
(often through terror) most, rewarded many, and 
attracted a strategically loyal few for at least 
fifty of those seventy-four years. Being for a 
certain period totalitarian, and always dictatorial 
did not prevent the Soviet party from being what 
is now fashionably referred to as socially 
"embedded"' [7, p.45]. Employing the analogous 
style of reasoning we will arrive at the following 
set of conclusions - first of all, even elites in 
"precarious position do not have to seek support 
from everyone" [25, p. 108]. Secondly, so 
transparent government's incompetence is 
rather a result of unconstrained power which, 
according to Karl Deutsch, "is the ability to 
afford not to learn" [26, p. 111]. Relative stability 
of Ukrainian political arrangement lies in a fact 
that the state has let the majority of population 
struggle for survival by its own means (within 
the frameworks of virtual and shadow 
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economies), has given many an opportunity for 
self-expression and possibilities for political and/ 
or economic mobility and in a manner strikingly 
akin to its Soviet predecessor has attracted 
strategically important few. Ukrainian stratum 
of "strategically few" is composed of those with 
rooted interests in existing "booty" capitalism as 
well as in patrimonial state which, according to 
Weber, is quite tolerant "toward social mobility 
and acquisition of wealth", but "does not favor 
rational enterprise" [11, p. 1102]. 
Stability, based upon such grounds, cannot 
hope for having life span of the Soviet Union but 
it may well become a long term pattern of the 
societal degeneration given the experience of 
numerous African and Latin American countries. 
It should be noted that I am concerned here 
with a regime stability in the narrow sense -
merely as an endurance which implies the 
persistence of pattern without references to 
"decisional effectiveness and authenticity" [27, 
p. 184]. Therefore, "a system may be stable 
because of... the ineffectiveness (or bad luck) 
of its opponents; it may persist as did the Third 
Republic, for no better reason that it never quite 
manages even to collapse, despite much 
opposition and many hairbreadth escapes" [27, 
p. 183]. This, of course, does not rule out the 
possibilities of revolutionary surprise - as Timur 
Kuran has observed "until the Iranian revolution, 
almost all students of Iran subscribed to the view 
that the Iranian state was traditionally despotic 
and the Iranian nation submissive and fatalistic" 
[28, p. 1536] 
These considerations lead us to the assertion 
of Weberian distinction between feudal and 
patrimonial polities. Listen to Machiavelli 
paradigmatic discussion of these two ideal-
types of political organization to which Weber 
would have subscribed himself: "principalities 
of which there is any historical record are 
managed in two different ways: in the first, one 
man is a prince and all the other officials are 
slaves, who act as ministers, and aid in 
governing the kingdom through his grace and 
permission; in the second type, there are a 
prince and barons, and the latter hold their 
positions not through the grace but through the 
sntimiitv r>f their hlnod Such barons have states 
and subjects of their own, who recognize them 
as lords and have a natural attachment to them. 
... Two examples of these two kinds of 
government in our times are the Turk and the 
king of France. The whole monarchical 
administration of the Turk is controlled by one 
lord; the others are his servants; and dividing 
his kingdom into sanjaks, he sends out different 
administrators and changes and varies them as 
seems good to him. But the king of France is 
placed in the midst of a multitude of lords, long 
established in their positions... They have their 
privileges, which the king cannot take away 
except at his peril" [5, p. 104]. If "federalization" 
of Russian state has become akin to 
decentralization of early feudalism, where the 
peripheral centers of power may challenge the 
authority of the state, Ukraine's political 
development can be perceived in terms of 
patrimonial type of domination. According to 
Weber, the generic feature of patrimonial state 
is ruler's ability to organize "his political power 
over extra-patrimonial areas and political 
subjects... just like the exercise of his 
patriarchal power... The establishment of 
"political domination", that is of one master's 
domination over other masters who are not 
subjects to his patriarchal power implies an 
affiliation of authority relations which differ 
only in degree and content, not in structure" 
[11, p.1013]. In other words, patrimonial 
domination fosters the personal dependency of 
state incumbents and political actors on the 
ruler (be it ancient prince or "modern" politician 
elected through universal suffrage): "Consider 
for example, the relationship between powerful 
political patrons and humble Saratsen 
shepherds. Relations of mutual obligation bind 
host and guest. What they have to offer each 
other may be very different: votes on the one 
side, a degree of security and protection on the 
other. ...Mutual courtesy marks the clear 
understanding that loyalty gets protection and 
protection gets loyalty" [29, p. 175]. This 
comment helps us appreciate the obvious 
orientation of incumbent regime towards 
capitalist accumulation intertwined with he self-
evident inefficiency of its market reform 
Dolicies -a puzzle usually explained by pointing 
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to the Ukrainian politicians lack of mysterious 
quality - political will to push through reforms. 
Such explanation tends to neglect Weber's 
account that "not ideas, but material and ideal 
interests, directly govern men's conduct" [17, 
p.280]. More scrupulous analysis of patrimonial 
state suggests that unlike charisma which 
rejects as undignified all methodical rational 
acquisition, in fact, all rational economic 
conduct, the former implies as the most 
fundamental obligation of the subjects "the 
material maintenance of the ruler... With the 
development of trade and of money economy 
the patrimonial ruler may satisfy his economic 
needs no longer through the oikos but through 
profit-oriented monopolism. ...In the course of 
financial rationalization patrimonialism moves 
imperceptibly toward bureaucrat ic 
administration, which resorts to systematic 
taxation" [11, p.1015]. These developments 
result in emergence of robber capitalism whose 
structure and spirit "differs radically from the 
rational management of an ordinary capitalist 
large-scale enterprise and is most similar to 
some old age phenomena: the huge rapacious 
enterprises in the financial and colonial sphere 
and occasional trade... The double nature of 
what may be called the "capitalist spirit", and 
the specific character of modern routinized 
capitalism with its professional bureaucracy, 
can be understood only if these two structural 
elements, which are ultimately different but 
everywhere intertwined, are conceptually 
distinguished" [11, p. 1118]. Even introduction 
of universal franchise does not automatically 
lead to destruction of the system of dependency 
relationship based on loyalty and fidelity 
intrinsically inherent to the political system 
based on patr imonial ism. Under the 
circumstances framed by patrimonial political 
structure the representative, in fact any elected 
high ranking official, is conceived as "the 
chosen "master" of his voters" [11, p. 1128]. To 
sum up, patrimonial system "gives free rain to 
the enrichment of the ruler himself, the court 
officials, favorites, governors, mandarins, the 
tax collectors, influence peddlers, and the great 
merchants and financiers who function as tax-
farmers, purveyors, and creditors. The ruler's 
favor and disfavor, grants and confiscations, 
continuously create new wealth and destroy it 
again" [11, p. 1099]. 
The above considerations bring about the 
issue of development. To my mind, Leninist 
regimes can be best conceptualized as a 
response to the conditions of national 
dependency - that was the case of all 
revolutionary system-building regimes guided by 
consensual ideology. (Consensual ideology, 
according to Jowitt, demands "internal agreement 
in terms of shared perspectives, the content of 
behavior, and the abolition of differences" [25, 
p.22]).The strategic developmental agenda of 
regimes in question included revolutionary 
breaking-through - industrialization, 
collectivization, mass education, and forging 
party cadres as well as national political 
community building [25]. Because of the grand 
failure of the Leninist project, post-Leninist 
political regimes face the similar challenge -
they have to make an attempt at becoming 
modern but under the conditions of rapid post-
modernization of the countries belonging to the 
core of the capitalist world system. Though 
ambiguous as it is, the notion of post-modernity 
goes beyond the mere discourse of philosophers 
and students of culture. Its implications can be 
traced in all societal spheres of advanced 
capitalist liberal-democratic countries. This itself 
is an additional "built-in" hindrance for post-
Leninist developmental project which bears a 
great resemblance with its Leninist predecessor 
- while the latter ended up with 
overindustrialized economy of 19th century type, 
its Western ideological adversaries were 
preparing for coming post-industrial, information, 
knowledge society. At present the former ones 
are confronted with a task of pursuing 
modernization strategies while, the West is 
leaving this stage behind. 
Eight years of clumsy efforts at implementing 
post-Leninist developmental task, which can be 
termed as a second edition of modernization, 
have proved to be a second failure. Perhaps, it 
would be the simplest solution to blame for 
bringing the country to standstill the resistance 
of "obsolete structures of public administration" 
that oppress the emergent civil society Í24. с 101. 
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Opposite explanation has recently been suggested 
by Volodymyr Polokhalo who has termed post-
Leninist regime post-communist neo-totalitarism 
which preys upon non-civil society [14]. Both 
approaches are equally onedimensional and fail 
to appreciate the singularity of the Ukrainian 
polity under the stress of transformation. 
Polokhalo's treatment of incumbent Ukrainian 
regime as post-communist neo-totalitarism is 
neither explanatory nor analytic, it can hardly 
even qualify as descriptive. Moreover, supposedly 
"novel" concept of non-civil society has been 
predated by concepts of scavenger and uncivil 
societies developed by Ken Jowitt [6] and Chris 
Hann [30] respectively long before the 
appearance of "seminal" study of Ukrainian 
author. 
Post-Leninist developmental project could 
have been based on capitalizing the achievements 
of Leninist transformation undertaking mentioned 
above and, thus, should have included resuming 
economic growth and modernization of economic 
relations that were strikingly primordial under the 
Soviet rule through the introduction of adequate 
regulation and overall liberalization, and 
incorporation of Ukrainian economy into the global 
world-system at a level of periphery with possible 
upgrading to semi-periphery in the future. 
Unfortunately the belief in institutional weakness 
of successive post-Leninist states has become 
uncritically accepted conventional wisdom among 
transitologists. It must be said that Ukraine 
inherited an elaborated system of administrative 
institutions from its Soviet predecessor. Though 
being not an ideal of effectiveness and efficiency, 
it could have shown much better performance 
had the interests of policy-makers coincided with 
the pursuit of developmental strategies. But 
endemic to the polity of patrimonial bent 
"traditionalism and arbitrariness affect very 
deeply the developmental opportunities of 
capitalism. Either the ruler himself or his officials 
seize upon the new chances of acquisition, 
monopolize them and thus deprive the capital 
formation of the private economy of its 
sustenance... On the other hand, the wide latitude 
of ruler's unrestricted discretion can reinforce the 
anti-traditional power of capitalism in a given 
case, as it happened in Europe during the period 
of absolutism. ...As a rule, the negative aspect 
of this arbitrariness is dominant, because... the 
patrimonial state lacks the political and 
procedural predictability, indispensable for 
capitalist development, which is provided by the 
rational rules of modern bureaucratic 
administration" [11, p. 1094-1095]. Both Marx 
and Weber and more recently world system 
theorists have asserted that such conditions are 
conducive to rapid expansion of merchant 
capital whose "independent development is in 
opposite relation to the general economic 
development of society" [31, c.360]. 
Rapid marketization of economy and 
development of capitalism more generally can 
be pursued through application of two mutually 
exclusive strategies - encouragement of 
accumulation and consumption respectively [32]. 
The successful accomplishment of the former 
task is only possible under condition of already 
achieved capital accumulation - the process 
which is now under way in contemporary 
Ukraine. Therefore, President Kuchma's recent 
proposal to boost economic growth through the 
use of consumption policies is a mixture of 
wishful thinking, conscious manipulation/ 
disinformation and ideological - in a classical 
Marxian sense - misrepresentation of reality 
[33]. As Marx's compelling analysis suggested, 
primitive accumulation can be effective only at 
somebody's expense when those somebody -
representatives of lower classes as a rule - are 
deprived of their property and transformed into 
wage labor. 
Appreciation of the complexity of Leninist 
societies with their undeniable achievements 
in education and industrialization should not be 
confused with their alleged modernity. As 
Hungarian political scientist I.Balogh has 
convincingly shown, industrialization - the 
major element of Leninist developmental 
agenda - if pursued "without launching 
processes in social and cultural spheres of 
modernization, eventually undermines itself and 
transforms into social regress" [34, p. 109]. 
Breaking-through with a national dependency 
under the leadership of charismatic institution 
- the party of organizational weapon type - in 
countries where bourgeoisie was almost absent, 
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reduced modernization to the task of industrial 
transformation aimed against the class of 
capitalist entrepreneurs. Thus, one of the major 
challenges to post-Leninist societies is whether 
they will be able to create conditions conducive 
to bourgeois modernization through socialization 
which is a "cultural, economic, and political 
process ultimately leading to (or possibly leading 
to) reconstruction of the whole structure of a 
society, emergence of a structured but united 
from the point of view of mentality system of 
values, norms, incentives in societal 
modernization and ensure the success of 
modernization" [34, p. 120]. Pursuit of solely 
marketization policies instead of developing 
frame of reference of modern (civil) society will 
lead to social differentiation cutting across 
between impoverishment and enrichment. 
Perhaps the most likely scenario of the 
direction of U k r a i n i a n post-Leninist 
transformation that has already begun to realize 
was suggested by I.Balogh who was drawing 
on the experience of Hungarian transformation: 
"under the circumstances of distinct polarization 
social tension will become the most immediate 
issue, superseding the alternatives of 
modernization. No doubt, that there is a 
threatening tendency of emergence of a type 
of poor entrepreneurial side by side with a rich 
strata which is not a bourgeois one, as well as 
accelerated deterioration and atomization of a 
weak itself middle class coupled with 
decreasing living standards and increasing 
wave of immigration of intelligentsia which is 
capable of playing a decisive role informing 
and proliferating cultural values and patterns 
of modernization. Coming years will show 
whether the tendency of accelerating of 
polarization along poverty/wealth line can be 
changed and reversed and if the revival of a 
middle class will begin or, despite opposite 
declarations and programs polarization of the 
poverty and wealth will become a defining 
factor molding the structure of society. In this 
case, now only under the slogan of "joining 
Europe" Hungary will inevitably find itself in a 
traditional impasse of East and Central 
European modernization" [34, p. 122]. What 
was thought of as just one possible alternative 
among many others of post-Leninist 
development in Hungary has become the 
steady pattern of societal decay in Ukraine. 
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Кутуєв Павло 
ДЕМОКРАТІЯ, ДЕРЖАВА І РОЗВИТОК: ВИПАДОК 
ПОСТ-ТОТАЛІТАРНОЇ УКРАЇНИ 
Стаття аналізує взаємодію політичного режиму та держави в постленінській Україні і 
висвітлює фактори, які призвели до краху сподівань на втілення моделі розвитку/модернізації 
країни. Стаття широко використовує концепції політичної соціології Макса Вебера та робить 
особливий наголос на понятті патрімоніальної держави та її наслідках для суспільного розвитку. 
